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Abstract
This paper provides a way of evaluating a player's contribution to her team and relates her
eort to her salaries. We collect data from UEFA Euro 2008 Tournament and construct the
passing network of each team. Then we determine the key player in the game while ranking all
the other players too. Next, we identify key groups of players to determine which combination
of players played more important role in the match. Using 2010 market values and observ-
able characteristics of the players, we show that players having higher intercentrality measures
regardless of their eld position have signicantly higher market values.
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Team like situations dominate many social and economic environments. Firms and organizations are
usually made up of smaller groups or teams. In fact recommendation letters often mention person's
ability to be a team player. An applicant's to be a team player is also tested in many interviews.
Work environments like R&D groups, special task forces and even academia to a certain extent
function as teams. Teamwork is an important feature of many games like soccer, basketball and
voleyball. This makes understanding to contribution of individual members to a team very useful
exercise. It can help design better teams and compensation packages. Identify the key players in
teams is also very useful for retention issues. In this paper, we develop a method for identifying key
players and key groups in teams.
There is a substantial literature on identifying the key node in a network. These may be degree
based measures that take into account the number of links that emanate and end at a node. (see for
instance Katz (1953), Freeman (1979), Hubbell (1965), Bonacich (1987) and Sade (1989)). Closeness
measure like those developed by Sabidussi (1966) and Freeman (1979) use some type of topological
distance in the network to identify the key players. Another measure called betweeness measure
(see for instance Freeman (1979)) uses the number of paths going through a node to determine its
importance. Borgatti and Everett (2006) develop a unied framework to measure the importance
of a node. Borgatti (2006) identies two types of key player problems (KPP). He argues that in
KPP-positive situation key players are those who can optimally diuse something in the network.
In a KPP negative situation key players are individuals whose removal leads to maximal disruption
in the network.
In a recent paper Ballester et al. (2006) provide microfoundation for the key player problem.
Their model has two vital ingredients: individual actions and interaction between players. In the
Nash equilibrium of the game each player chooses their individual action taking both components
into account. The key player is the one whose removal leads to the greatest overall reduction in
eort. Thus, their approach builds strategic behavior into the network, and combines both negative
and positive aspects of the problem.
In this paper, we develop a Team Game based on the individual actions and interactions between
players. Additionally, each player gains utility when the team achieves its desired outcome. This
1team outcome depends on individual eort and an ability term for each player. We then develop a
new intercentrality measure that takes into account each player's contribution to their teammates
and the team outcome in fact captures the contributions of other players to each player for achieving
the team's objective. Another interesting feature is that following Ballester et al. (2006) we dene
key player problem from a social planner's perspective. In context of teams the chairman, team
leader or head coaches can be regarded as the social planners.
This paper has two contributions. The rst contribution is extending Ballester et al. (2006)
model and introducing team (or network) outcome component into the analysis to rank players
according to their contributions to their teammates. Nash Equilibrium of the model provides the
optimal amount of individual eorts' of each player. It implies that if the player has a higher return
for his individual actions or a higher ability parameter then she will have more incentives to perform
individual actions. The second contribution is providing an empirical illustration of the approach
using a team sport: soccer. We observe the passing eort of international soccer players to proxy
the amount of interaction between players in UEFA European Championship 2008 and identify the
key players and key groups in the network. It is important to note that we are not seeking the
best player on the eld. Rather, we are looking for the player whose contribution to his team is
maximal. Finally, we show that players who have higher interactions (passings and receivings) have
signicantly higher ratings from experts and market values.
Determining a key group instead of a key player is an interesting aspect since more than one player
may have equivalent level of contribution to their teammates. In addition to that, it is important to
identify which combination of players have more importance within the network. This information
is crucial for the team managers who wish to form a team with individuals who provide dierent
adjacency to their teammates. It is important to note that the members of the of key groups are
not the best working peers but they are the ones whose joint contribution to their team is maximal.
Temurshoev (2008) extends Ballester et al.(2006) paper by introducing the key group dimension.
Temurshoev (2008) searches for the key group, whose members are, in general, dierent from the
players with highest individual intercentralities. We also apply Temurshoev's (2008) approach and
determine the key groups of players.
The methods in this paper can be extended to the more general situations where people work in
teams; however, in this paper, we provide an empirical example from international soccer matches.
2Taking this approach has some advantages. First, soccer is a team sport and the payo of players
in the teams greatly depend on the team outcome. Second, interactions within soccer teams are
observable and passing eort of players is a good metric to identify these interactions. We create a
unique passing data from UEFA European Championship 2008 and identify the key players and key
groups of teams which played in the Quarter Final, Semi-Final and Final stage of the tournament.1
After the introduction, the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 denes the Team Game and
various centrality measures, identies the Nash Equilibrium and our team intercentrality measure.
Section 3 motivates the use of soccer data as an empirical application. Section 4 identies the
empirical methodology. The paper concludes with discussions and possible extensions.
2 Team Game
In this section, we rst dene the team game. Then we introduce the various centrality measures
and nd the Nash Equilibrium of the game. Finally, we provide the relationship between the Nash
equilibrium and team intercentrality measure.
2.1 Model Setup
We begin by introducing the Team Game. We dene the individual player's payo function using
the notation of Ballester et al. (2006) as far as possible.







ijxixj + Z: (1)
The rst two terms form a standard quadratic utility function where xi  0 is dened as the
individual eort of player i. Here, i > 0 stands for the coecient of individual actions and ii < 0,
the coecient of the second term, denes concavity in own eort i.e., @2Ui=@x2
i = ii < 0. For
simplicity we assume that these coecients are identical for all players and we drop the subscript.2
The third term captures the bilateral inuences between players with ij being the coecient of
this term. Note that ij could be positive or negative depending on whether the interaction is a
1Fifty European National Teams played qualifying stages and only 16 of them were qualied for the UEFA Euro
2008. So, it is reasonable to expect that the quality of the players in the national tournaments are similar. Thus,
interaction between players plays a crucial role in determining the outcome of the matches making our results more
important.
2We relax this assumption and consider the cases when i and ii can be dierent for every player in Proposition
1 (a)-(b).
3strategic complement or substitute. We let  = [ij] be the matrix of these coecients. The last
expression is the team outcome term which denotes the desired team goal. For instance, for a sales
team this could be achieving sales. In a game soccer this could be winning the game or scoring
more goals. This term contains a common set of variables for all players since they all share the
same team outcome. For simplicity, let Z =
Pn
i=1 ixi where i denes each individual's ability to
help achieve the team's goal. The parameter  is a scale factor that could be used to capture the
importance of dierent events for the team.3
Our team game diers from that of Ballester et al. (2006) model in the last term. This allows us to
consider the n players acting together towards a common objective. While alternative formulations
are possible, we believe our framework has certain advantages. First, it allows for explicit comparison
with Ballester et al. (2006). Second, while all eort by player provides a utility, the eort adjusted by
the ability parameter is important for achieving the team outcome. This can be useful for empirical
illustration since it may not be possible to obtain data on i and ii. The ability parameter i on
the other hand could be obtained from available data.
Following Ballester et al. (2006), let  = min (ijji 6= j) and  = max (ijji 6= j). We assume
that  < min (;0). Let  =   min ;0  0. If eorts are strategic substitutes for some pair of
players, then  < 0 and  > 0; otherwise,   0 and  = 0. Let  =  +   0. We assume that
 > 0. Dene gij = (ij +)=. Note that, the gij's are weighted and directed allowing us to obtain
relative complementarity measures. Consequently, the elements gij of the weighted adjacency matrix
lie between 0 and 1.4 The adjacency matrix G = [gij] is dened as a zero diagonal nonnegative
square matrix. The zero diagonal property assures that no player is connected to themselves (i.e,
there are no direct loops from player i to i.) Then,  matrix which captures the cross eects can
be decomposed into the following expression:
 =  I   U + G (2)
where  I shows the concavity of the payos in terms of own actions,  U shows the global inter-
3In principle, one could dene Z to capture the importance of the team's objective. Here, for simplicity we assume
it to be .
4If we do not use a weighted G matrix then G matrix involves only 0s and 1s as its elements. This will imply
that the weight for having more connections with the same player is zero. So, gij = 1 then there is a connection and
if gij = 0 then there is no connection between player i and player j. However, it is very important to identify the
relative interaction between players rather than just considering if there is a connection between player i and j. Thus,
using a weighted G matrix is important to illustrate team environments.
4action eect, and G shows the complementarity in players' eorts. Using the above decomposition,
Equation (1) becomes:










gijxixj + zZ (3)
for all players i = 1;:::;n.
2.2 Centrality Measures
Here, we dene the centrality measures needed to identify the key player. Let M be a matrix dened
as follows:





The above matrix keeps track of the number of paths that start from player i and end at player j
with a decay factor, a and a given adjacency matrix G. Note that players can also contribute to
their teammates through indirect connections, but these have lower weights.
Following Ballester et al.(2006), we dene the Bonacich centrality measure as:
b(g;a) = [I   aG] 1  1 (5)
where 1 is a n1 vector of ones, n is number of players in the team and I is a nn identity matrix.
The Bonacich centrality measure counts the total number of paths that originates from player i.
Note that bi is the row sum of the M matrix. Equivalently, the Bonacich centrality measure is
bi(g;a) = mii(g;a) +
P
i6=j mij(g;a). Next, we dene a weighted Bonacich centrality measure with
the ability parameter, i as the weight:
b(g;a) = [I   aG] 1   (6)
The Ballester et al. (2006) intercentrality measure (ICM) for an asymmetric G is given by:





We dene another centrality measure which accounts for the weighted receivings of the players




mij(g;a)  i (8)
5This (receiving) centrality measure takes into account the paths that end in player i weighted by
the ability parameter of the player.
Note that, in the context of teams, the  matrix is unlikely to be symmetric since the number of
paths from player i to player j will be dierent for at least one pair. Hence, an asymmetric  matrix
will lead to an asymmetric G matrix. We now dene a new intercentrality measure for determining
the key players in the teams. The team intercentrality measure (TICM) for an asymmetric G matrix
for the Team Game is given by:







mij(g;a)  i (9)
Unlike the Bonacich centrality measure, ICM takes into account both the connections that player
i sends to her teammates and the number of connections that player i receives. The primary
dierence between ICM and TICM is in the last term which measures player i's contribution to the
team outcome by her ability parameter.
2.3 Nash Equilibrium of Team Game
In this section, we show that the Team Game has a unique interior Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2.1. Consider a matrix of cross-eects which can be decomposed into (3). Let ij 6= ji
for at least one j 6= i, = > ((G)) and   j   ^ xj . Dene  = =. Then, there exists a
unique, interior Nash Equilibrium of the team game given by:
x() =
b(g;) + b(g;a)
 + ^ b(g;)
where ^ b(g;) =
Pn
i=1 bi(g;).
Proof. The condition for a well dened interior Nash equilibrium of the Team Game is that the




I   G] 1 (10)
Let (1(G)) be the spectral radius of G matrix.5 Then,  > (1(G)) ensures that Equation (9) is
invertible by Theorem III of Debreu and Herstein (1953, pg.601). Once the condition is veried, an
5Spectral radius of G matrix is dened as the inverse of the norm of the highest eigenvalue of G matrix.




(x) = 0 and x
i > 0 for all i=1, 2,...,n
Hence, maximizing Ui with respect to xi yields:
@Ui
@xi
= i + iixi +
X
j6=i
ijxj + i = 0
Therefore, x solves:
1 + I = (I + U   G)x
Pre-multiplying both sides with [I   G] 1 and using the denition of b(g;), we obtain:
x = (   ^ x)[I   G] 11 + b(g;)
where ^ x =
Pn
i=1 x






 + ^ b(g;)
where ^ b(g;) =
Pn
i=1 bi(g;).





= ii < 0 is always concave. This argument ensures that x is interior. Now, we
establish uniqueness by dealing with the corner solutions.
Let ();();() and G() be the elements of the decomposition of . For all matrices
Y, vector y and set S  1;2;:::;n, Ys is a submatrix of Y with s rows and columns and ys is the
subvector of y with rows in s. Then, (s)  (), (s)  () and (s)  (). Also,
(G) =  + (U   I)   iiI   zZ and the coecients in G (s rows and columns) are at least as
high as the the coecients in (s)Gs. From Theorem I of Debreu and Herstein (1953, pg.600),
1((s)Gs)  1(()G). Therefore, () > ()1(G) implies that (s) > (s)1(Gs).
Let y be a non interior Nash equilibrium of the Team Game. Let S  1;2;:::;n such that y
i = 0
if and only if i 2 N n S. Thus, y
i > 0 for all i 2 S.
@Ui
@xi









(0) = i + i
7and 0 cannot be a Nash Equilibrium. Then,
 sy
s = (Is + Us   Gs)y




s =  + s
[Is   Gs]y
s =  + s    ^ y
s  1s
where the last step utilizes Usy
s = ^ y
s1s and  = =. Pre-multiplying both sides by [Is Gs] 1
yields:
y
s = [I   Gs] 1 + [I   Gs] 1s    ^ y
s[Is   Gs] 1  1s (11)
y
s =






Every player i 2 N n S is best responding with y
i = 0 so that y


















j + i  0
for all i 2 N n S. Now substitute y
s instead of y
j in the above equation:
@Ui
@xi













(y) = (    ^ y
s)[1 +  X
j2S





If   j    ^ y
sj then y
i  0 using Equations (10) and (11), which is a contradiction.
The Nash equilibrium of the Team Game has interesting implications. First, it identies the
optimal eort of individuals in the network based on the given interactions between players. It
explains why some players have low centrality values. For instance, players who have higher  and 
have greater incentives to perform individual actions. The Nash equilibrium of the game implies that
when the ability parameter of the individual increases, the individuals will have greater incentives
to perform individual actions.
A unique interior Nash equilibrium exists even when players have heterogeneity in returns (i)
and concavity (ii) in individual actions are proved in Proposition 1 (a) and (b).
8Proposition 1




(b): If i 6= j, ii 6= jj for at least one player and   max ji    ^ xj, then Nash equilibrium
of the team game is:
x() =
be (g;e ) + f b(g;)
e  + e ^ b(g;e )
Proof: See Appendix.
2.4 Key Player
We now provide a method to identify the key player in the team from the social planner's perspective
based on the relationship between TICM and the aggregate Nash equilibrium eort levels.
We denote by G
 i (resp.  i) the new adjacency matrix (resp. matrix of cross-eects), obtained
from G (resp. from ) by setting all of its ith row and column coecients to zero. The resulting
network is g i. The planner's problem is to reduce x() optimally by picking the appropriate
player from the population. Formally, she solves max fx() x(
 i)ji = 1;:::;ng. This is a nite
optimization problem and has at least one solution. Let i be a solution. We call i the key player
in Team Game, and removing i from the initial network g has the highest impact on the aggregate
equilibrium level.
Theorem 2.2. Let  > 1(G). The key player of the Team Game i solves maxfx()  
x(
 i)ji = 1;:::;ng and has the highest team intercentrality measure (TICM) in g, that is ^ ci(g;) >
^ ci(g;) for all i = 1;:::;n.
In the proof, since we allow for asymmetric  and G matrices, we adapt Lemma 1 from Ballester
et al.(2006) for this case.
Lemma 1: Let M = [I aG] 1 matrix be well dened and nonnegative. Then mji(g;a)mik(g;a) =
mii(g;a)[mjk(g;a)   mjk(g i;a)] for all k 6= i 6= j.
Proof. Aggregate Nash equilibrium in the Team Game depends on the Bonacich centrality and the
Bonacich centrality weighted by the ability parameter of the player. Note that 1(G) > 1(G
 i).
Thus, when M(g;) is well dened and nonnegative then so is M(g i;) for all i = 1;:::;n.
9Let bji(g;) = bj(g;) bj(g i;) for all j 6= i. This is the contribution of the player i to the
player j's Bonacich centrality in g. Recall ri(g;a) =
Pn
j=1 mij(g;a)  i. Summing over all j 6= i
and adding bi(g;) to both sides and adding the loss of the player's receivings centrality measure
gives the aggregate eect of player i's removal from the Team Game.
b(g;)   b(g i;) + ri





where ei is the loss function when player i is removed from the network. Our goal is to nd ith
player whose removal will result in the highest ei such that ei(g;)  ei(g;) for all i = 1;:::;n:
ei(g;) = bi(g;) +
X
j6=i







[mjk(g;)   mjk(g i;)] + ri
(g;)
Using Lemma 1 for the asymmetric G matrix, the above expression becomes:














3 Soccer: A Team Game and The Role of Passing
Modern soccer is very much a team game. The performance of players depends crucially on each
other's actions and interaction between players forms a vital component of the game. Soccer coaches,
training books and authorities emphasize the team aspect of the game. As the great Brazilian soccer
player Pele said in a press conference in Singapore in November 2006, \I think the problem with
Brazil was lack of teamwork because everybody used to say Brazil will be in the nal." Pele added
that Brazil had the best individual players against France, but they lost the game because they
could not play as a team.6 On November 29, 2007, Gerard Houllier, the famous technical director of
the French Football Federation, speaking at the 9th UEFA Elite Youth Football Conference summed
this up as \Teamwork is the crux of everything."7























































Average Number of Passes
Avg Number of Shots vs Avg Number of Passes in UEFA Euro 
2008
Figure 1: The relationship between average number of shots per game and average number of passes
per game in UEFA Euro 2008.
One important aspect of soccer that makes it a team game is the fact that passing is a very
crucial part of the game. In the early days of soccer, the game was based on individual skills such
as tackling and dribbling. The Scots invented the passing game in the 1870s and everyone soon
realized that it is easier move the ball than players, and the ball is faster than humans. Since then
passing and receiving have become a key part of a soccer team's strategies. A soccer training manual
by Luxbacher (2005) emphasizes the importance of passing in the following \Passing and receiving
skills form the vital thread that allows 11 individuals to play as one - that is the whole to perform
greater than the sum of its parts." Similarly, Miller and Wingert (1975) addresses the importance
of passing in soccer by stating that \There are no more crucial skills than passing in soccer because
soccer is a team sport. The most eective set plays involve accurately passing and receiving the
ball."
Luhtanen et al. (2001) report that successful passes at the team level are important for explain-
ing the success in the UEFA European Championship 2000. Specically, Luhtanen et al. (2001)
document that there is one to one relationship between the ranking of the team in Euro 2000 and
the ranking of the team in terms of successful passing and receivings. Thus, it seems reasonable
that passing is a good metric for identifying the interactions between players.
11Figure 1 displays the relationship between average number of shots per game and average num-
ber of passes per game of the national teams in the UEFA European Championship 2008.8 The
correlation coecient between these variables is 0.7. The regression coecient obtained from re-
gressing average number of shots on goal per game on average number of passes per game indicates
that on the average 27 passes created 1 additional shot on goal for the team in Euro 2008. This is
consistent with the idea that teams need ball possession to create goal scoring opportunities which
directly aects the outcome of the match. Clearly, passing is an important interaction variable in
our dataset.
There are some advantages to using passing for capturing player interactions. First, it is pairwise
and both the sender and receiver of the pass must be successful to complete the action. So, the
pairwise passing enables us to utilize the network theory to understand the contribution of each
player to the team. Second, passing as a measure of interaction is observable and easily quantiable.
Data for other aspects of the soccer such as tackling, dribbling or o the ball movement of players
are very hard to observe. In addition, often identifying the quality of these actions require subjective
judgement. Finally, even if we had data about these aspects, it would be still dicult to quantify
those variables exactly.
4 Empirical Methodology
This section illustrates our methodology for identifying the key player and key groups in soccer
teams. First, we present the payo function of players in soccer teams. Second, we describe our data
collection process. Next, we calculate the ICM and TICM by using the corresponding denitions in
the paper and provide our results for the key players and key groups. Finally, we conduct sensitivity
checks for the model parameters used for identifying key players.
8This data was accessed from the following website http://www1.uefa.com/tournament/statistics/teams. It is
















  Figure 2: Discounting the successful passes and loses by “d”  
Discount by d 
No Discount 
Discount by d 
No Discount  No Discount 
Own Half of the Field  Opponent’s Half of the Field 
4.1 Empirical Model
We return to the individual payo function given in Equation (1) and interpret its terms for the
game of soccer.9








where xi is dened as how often the player i kicks the ball. This includes all passes, shots at the
goal, corners and throw-ins of player i. The coecient i measures the returns to individual eort.
As before the utility function is quadratic in own eort with @2Ui=@x2
i = ii < 0. The third term
captures the interaction among players with ij being the number of passes from player i to j. Thus,
player i's utility from interacting with player j is weighted by how often he passes to j.
9Observe the payo function shows only the actions of the team of interest. However, it does take the other team's
eort into account implicitly. For example, as long as one of the team has ball possession, the other team cannot have
any shots or passes.
13In the above payo function, ij represents the complementary action of player i on player j.
ij indicates the number of (discounted) successful passes from player i to j minus the number of
(discounted) unsuccessful passes from player i to j. This means that if ij is positive, number of
successful passes from player i to player j exceeds the number of unsuccessful passes from player i to
j. While measuring the complementarity in players' eort, we introduce a discounting parameter, d
in constructing the  matrix. Passes that are made far from the opponent's goal have little inuence
on creating a goal scoring opportunity. Therefore, we discount the passes that are made in own half
of the eld by a factor 0 < d < 1. On the other hand, if player i successfully passes the ball to
player j, and if player j is the opponent's half, then we do not discount that pass. Unsuccessful
passes are discounted in the opposite way. If a player i losses the ball while trying to pass to player
j, we look at the position of j. If player j is in the opponent's half, then we discount that loss by
d. Similarly, if player i losses the ball while trying to pass to player j who is in his own half, then
we do not discount that loss. Basically, if player i losses the ball near his own goal then that is a
serious loss for the team. The intuition for not discounting the unsuccessful passes made in the own
half is that players have to run back which hurts the team's play and may create an opportunity for
the opponent to start an attack from an advantageous position.
The last term of the payo function explains how an individual's utility depends on team outcome.
We assume that the team outcome, Z is a linear function of each player's eort and ability parameter.
The coecient  is a scale parameter that can be used to capture the importance of the game. In
this framework, the ability parameter, i is dened as the scoring probability of player i where i =
Number of goals scored by player i / Number of total shots on goal of player i. Alternatively, Z can
also be dened as the outcome of the match. Specically, Z can be assumed to be taking values of
f1, 0, -1g where Z = 1 implies that the team wins the game, Z = 0 implies that the match ended in
a draw, and Z =  1 implies that the team lost the match. For the above denition of Z, the Nash
equilibrium of the Team Game boils is identical to the Ballester et al. (2006) and allows us use the
ICM provided by the authors in Remark 5 (note nd page number).
4.2 Data and Results
Our data consists of all the matches from the Quarter Final onwards for the UEFA European
Championship 2008. All the data that is used in the study is available from the authors on request.
14Unfortunately, ocial passing data from UEFA's website is not adequate for our study due to a
number of reasons. First, UEFA provides data only on the successful passes between player i and j
and excludes the unsuccessful passes. Second, UEFA statistics do not provide the passing position
of the players which is important for assessing the quality of passing. Finally, UEFA provides the
total number of passes between player i and j in the entire tournament rather than match by match.
Hence, we created a unique passing data set ourselves by watching the matches. This was done
by freezing the frame at the time of the passing attempt and recording the player making the pass
and the receiver in a matrix by noting the eld position. We also discounted the passes using the
method described in the previous section. Net discounted passes were used to create the interaction
matrix, .10 The net passes are used to determine the 0
ijs in  matrix. As expected, the  and
G matrices are both asymmetric.
In order to facilitate comparisons across mathes we dene a tournament wide  and  which are
the same for every team. First we obtain the highest amount of positive and negative interaction
between each pair of players throughout the tournament. Using this, the tournament wide  and
 parameters are chosen as 5 and 20 respectively. This allows us to compare the same player's
intercentrality measure from dierent matches as well as compare the intercentrality measure of
dierent players from dierent matches. 11
Data for creating the tournament wide scoring probabilities of each player was obtained from
ESPN's website. [put the website here] Ideally, the life time scoring probability of a player would
be i in the theocratical model. However, this data is not available and we use the tournament
wide measure as a proxy for this. Next, we calculate the M matrix, centrality vector (b) and
intercentrality vectors c and ^ c by using the denitions provided in Section 2. Note that assigning a
value to a is crucial for obtaining a pure and interior Nash equilibrium. Ballester et al. (2006) note
that for the case of asymmetric  and G matrices, a should be less than the spectral radius of G,
which is inverse of the norm of the highest eigenvalue of G. The greatest eigenvalue of G matrices
for the teams in the sample is 7.07 and hence following the above rule, the decay factor, a, is set to
10According to ocial statistics on average 800 successful passes occur in a match and it is a tedious exercise to
record every passing attempt. Note that we also take into account the unsuccessful passing eort which is not reported
by the ocial statistics.
11Note that the Netherlands vs Russia, Spain vs Italy and Croatia vs Turkey matches went into the extra time.
Therefore, comparing the players in the these games with those ended in 90 minutes is not possible. The cross
comparisons are valid for match lengths of the same duration. We discuss this issue in more detail in the next section.
150.125 for all matches. Since we did not have any guide lines for discount factor, d 2 [0;1] we assume
that d = 0:5 for all matches. Using all of these parameters we then compute TICM and ICM of each
player.
The corresponding calculations for the Final, Semi Final and Quarter Final games for Euro 2008
are reported for each team in Tables 1-7. In those tables, ^ c refers to TICM and c indicates (ICM)
of Ballester et al. (2006). We nd that the results obtained by using TICM are better at capturing
the players who have a direct inuence on the outcome of the matches since it also incorporates the
scoring probabilities. The highest value of TICM is observed in the Spain vs Italy Quarter Final
game for Fabregas who has a value of 8.67. Note that this match ended in extra time. The highest
value of TICM is observed in the Germany vs Portugal Quarter Final game for Deco of Portugal who
has a value of 6.44 for a match which ended in normal time.[some arguments from slides interpret
results not biased aganist forwards etc] However, since the data on scoring probabilities of players is
not life time scoring probabilities, it also causes players who have very few shots in the tournament
but scored a goal to have a high TICM in some matches.[provide example from data and explain]
Therefore, we also report ICM results as a sensitivity check. [highest IM measure]
4.3 Sensitivity Checks
There is a concern that determination of the key player may depend on the our chosen values of the
decay factor, a and discount factor, d. In fact, by means of an example Ballester et al.(2006) show
that the key player may be dierent for dierent values of a. Similarly, the key player may change
depending the value of discount factor, d. Hence, in order to check the robustness of our results,
we conduct a simulation analysis by changing the values of those parameters. We allow a to vary
from 0 to 0.125 in increments of 0.001. Simultaneously, we use the same increment and increase the
value of d from 0 to 1. Since we perform the simulations for all matches and all teams, this gives us
14  125,000 = 1.75 million simulations. We nd that the key player identied by ICM changes 15
percent of a time. On the other hand, the identied key players by using TICM change 40 percent of
a time. There is a greater variability in TICM results because the scoring probability of the players
are specic to the Euro 2008 tournament. Since the scoring probability itself shows great variability,
it makes the TICM measure more idiosyncratic. The passign game on the other hand is more stable
and therefore the ICM results have lesser variation.
164.4 Key Group
In this section, we determine the key groups of players following Temurshoev (2008). In fact the idea
of the key groups [....Zenou.... put that in citation ]Key groups of players in the matches provide
information about the joint performance of players in the group. This is a valuable information for
the soccer clubs, managers and coaches who wish the form their teams with individuals that provide
dierent adjacencies to their teammates. In order to identify key groups of size k in a team, we take
every possible combination of k players from the team and determine the reduction in the aggregate
Nash equilibrium by their removal from the team. The key group consists of players whose removal
leads to largest reduction in the aggregate Nash equilibrium.
We use Temurshoev's (2008) approach to compute the TICM of a group of k players. Removing
players from the game creates a decrease in the expected number of goals in addition to the reduction
in interaction between players. Therefore, the group intercentrality measure for TICM is dened as:





where E is the nk matrix dened as E = (ei1;:::;eik) with eir being the ith
r column of the identity
matrix, k being the number of players in the group and 1  k  n. The rst term captures the
eect of the removal of a group of players in g and the second term captures the eect of reduction
in the desired outcome of the team. It can be readily checked that for k = 1, the above expression
boils down to the team intercentrality measure (TICM) of a player which is given in Equation (8).
Note that the key group is not always comprised of the individuals having the highest intercentrality
measure. As described in Borgatti (2006) and Temurshoev (2008), according to the redundancy
principle key groups involve players who provide dierent adjacency to their teammates.
We choose key group sizes of k = 2 and k = 3 and calculate every possible group's intercentrality
measure using ICM and TICM. The results for all the countries and matches in the sample are
provided in Tables 8-12. In these tables, we report the top two key groups. In the key group
tables, the column player position identies the eld position of the player. These positions are D
(Defense), M (Mideld) and F (Forward). The rank in the ^ c column identies the player's rank
according to (TICM). The other key group results using ICM is available upon request. For an
interesting comparison, we also provide the ICM key group results of Spain in Table 13. Generally,
the key groups obtained by using TICM include more forward players. [..........Some info from slides
17explain why interesting......]
4.5 Player Ratings, Market Value and (Team) Intercentrality
In this subsection, the eect of intercentrality measure of the players who played in the Final, Semi-
Final and Quarter Final games in Euro 2008 on their average ratings and market values will be
discussed.
We introduce the average ratings that are given by the experts to the analysis to show that
the performance of the players depend on their interactions with their teammates according to the
experts. We obtained the average ratings from three sources: Goal.com, ESPN and SkySports. We
create a variable of average rating for each player which is the obtained by taking of the average of
the ratings.12 We use these sources since they use the same scale and they also provide ratings for
the substitute and substituted players in the matches. Also, these sources are outside the competing
countries in UEFA EURO 2008 which eliminates potential bias in the ratings.
Next, we investigate whether having a higher ICM or TICM in Euro 2008 aects the market values
of the players. Considering the eect of intercentrality on the salaries would be more interesting.
However, the salaries of soccer players in Europe are private and not publicly available. Nevertheless,
Frick (2007) and Battre et al. (2008) regard the estimated market value of the soccer players obtained
from http://www.transfermarkt.de 13 as a good and reliable source to proxy the undisclosed salary
of players. Battre et al.(2008) points out that there is a strong relationship between the market value
of the players and their salaries for the players in Bundesliga, German First Division.14 Using their
argument, the estimated market value of the players are obtained for the year 2010 to proxy the salary
of the players. The website also provides information about the other observable characteristics
of the soccer players such as: Date of birth, club, nation, position, and number of international
appearances, number of international goals, preferred foot and captaincy. We use the Club UEFA
points and Nation UEFA points which are available from UEFA's website in order to capture the
12The correlation coecient of ratings from the above sources are 0.7 thus we prefer to take the average of these
ratings rather than using them one by one. Also, taking the average of the ratings will reduce the subjectivity in
measuring the performance of the players.
13transfermarkt.de does not allow user to track the past market values. We saved the data about the players in
March, 19 2010.
14Battre et al.(2006) obtains estimated market values of soccer players from a German sports magazine Kicker.
However, Kicker only provides the market values of the players who only play at Bundesliga. However, they conduct
a sensitivity check with transfermarkt data and they state that the correlation between those two sources are high.
18quality and reputation of the players. Club and Nation points are announced by UEFA yearly and
points are earned for being successful in UEFA club or national tournaments. The points that are
provided by UEFA for the year 2008 are composed of the points earned in 2003-2008 period. We
combine the available data from with the intercentrality measure, Club and Nation Rank measured
by the UEFA points in 2008. The descriptive statistics about the data set are provided in Table 14.
In order to analyze whether there is a correlation between average ratings and (team) inter-
centrality measure, we consider the following base model:
AvgRatingit = 1+1(T)ICMit+1Agei+1Age2+1Positioni+ 1ClubRanki+1NationRanki+it:
Similarly, we consider another base model to investigate the relationship between the market values
of soccer players and their (team) intercentrality measure:
LogEMVi = 2+2(T)ICMi+2Agei+1Age2+2Positioni+ 2ClubRanki+2NationRanki+ui:
In the above regression models, the i subscript represents the player i and the t subscript repre-
sents the match t. In model 1, average rating is the dependent variable and stands for the average
ratings obtained from 3 reliable sources: Goal.com, ESPN and SkySports. In model 2, Log EMV
is the dependent variable obtained from transfermarkt.de and represents the log of the estimated
market value of the players in million euros. (T)ICM stands for the (team) intercentrality measure
and identies the contribution of player i to her teammates. Position is a dummy variable that
identies the position of the player. We consider three dierent positions for the players: Defense
(D), Mideld (M) and Forward(F).15 Club Rank and Nation Rank indicate the rank of the club
and nation of the player measured by UEFA points. They are included to capture the reputation
of the player as well as the individual quality. i and ui are the error terms for Model 1 and 2
respectively. In addition to the control variables in the base model, we regress the same dependent
variables on a broader set of control variables including national team dummies, captaincy, height
and preferred foot. The estimates are close and the coecient of ICM and TICM variables are still
signicant. Since we have a small sample size, we prefer to use and report the results for the base
models. Another important control variable is contract length of the players since according to the
Bosman Rules in European football it is likely that players who are near to their contract expiration
15Goalkeepers are excluded from the regression analysis. Niko Kovac (Croatia) and Robert Kovac (Croatia) retired
from professional soccer before 2010 and are also excluded.
19dates have lower market values.16 We checked the remaining duration of contracts of the players in
our sample which is available in transfermarkt.de. There are only 12 players whose contracts' expire
at the end of 2009-2010 season. Inclusion or exclusion of those players do not aect our results.
Some players are observed more than once in the tournament and they have dierent average
ratings and intercentrality measures in dierent matches. However, we have only one observation
for the market value of the players and the other control variables are time independent with the
current setup. Model 1 can be estimated by using panel data methods (population average, pooled
OLS or random eects) whereas Model 2 cannot be estimated by panel data methods. In order to
deal with this issue, we take the average of the average ratings, (team) intercentrality measures and
use GLS estimation in the estimation of Models 1 and 2. We provide the estimation results of Model
1 by using pooled OLS since average ratings and (team) intercentrality measures vary from match
to match.
The estimation results for the relationship between average ratings and (team) intercentrality
measures are provided in Tables 15 and 16. In the pooled OLS estimation, we estimate a linear
regression model where the time variable is the match. Ideally, we could run a random eects
model. However, there is not enough idiosyncratic variance in the data. In Model 15, we report the
cluster-robust standard errors. We include a dummy variable ET to control for the minutes played
of the players. ET takes the value of 1 if the corresponding player played more than 90 minutes
in any match and 0 otherwise. In Table 16, we take the average of the average ratings and (team)
intercentrality measures and have only one observation for each player and we report cluster-robust
standard errors. The ndings suggest that there is a strong relationship between the TICM and the
average ratings. Specically, players who have higher TICM performed better than their teammates
according to the experts. For other sensitivity checks, we include the players who play enough time
in the game specically who played more than on the average 30 minutes. We lose 30 observations,
but the results are robust. Another important factor to control for is whether or not the match
ended in normal time. We dene a dummy variable ET which is equal to 1 if the match ended in
extra time and 0 otherwise. With the inclusion of this variable, TICM is signicant whereas ICM is
not. Therefore, we conclude that TICM better explains the average ratings since it also incorporates
16Bosman Rules is an important factor aecting the free movement of labor and had a profound eect on the
transfers of football players within the EU. It allows professional football players in the European Union (EU) to
move freely to another club at the end of their contract with their present team.
20the goals scored by the players.
The estimation results investigating the relationship between the estimated market value and
(team) intercentrality measures in Euro 2008 is provided in Table 17. We again report the results
for both ICM and TICM. The standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replications.17 According
to the estimation results, intercentrality measure in UEFA Euro 2008 explains the 2010 market values
of the players. One standard deviation increase in the intercentrality measure (ICM) creates on the
average 9.84 percent increase in the market values of the players. On the other hand, one standard
deviation increase in TICM yields on the average 10.88 percent increase in the market values of the
players. It might be the case that, intercentrality measure is important for only a certain group of
players (say midelders) who play in the some certain position of the eld. To test this hypothesis,
we interact the intercentrality measure of players with their position dummies. The ndings suggest
that intercentrality measure is equally important at 5 percent signicance level. (i.e, the eect of
intercentrality measure is homogenous in the sample with respect to players' positions on the eld.)
Note that the regression models use the (team) intercentrality measures which are calculated
for specic parameters of a = 0:125 and d = 0:5. As a sensitivity check, we calculated the (team)
intercentrality measures for a = 0:1 and d = 0:4;0:5;0:6 and a = 0:125 and d = 0:4;0:6. The
estimated coecients and their signicance are very similar.18
5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we introduce a Team Game and develop a measure of identifying the key player
in the teams. Our work extends the intercentrality measure of Ballester et al.(2006) to contain
an additional term. This additional term comes from the team outcome expression in the utility
functions of players. This term suggests that a player gets utility when her team achieves its desired
outcome. The calculated team intercentrality measure (TICM) can be regarded as team performance
index of players. The calculated group team intercentrality measure (^ cg) can be interpreted as the
joint contribution of players to their teams.
Our model measure also has some common features with intercentrality measure (ICM) of
17Since we have only one market value observation for the players, we lose signicant amount of observations. To
deal with this issue, we bootstrap the standard errors.
18We do not report the estimates obtained by using the above parameters but they are available upon request.
21Ballester et al.(2006). We can say that a key player does not need to have the highest amount
of individual payo. In addition, a key player does not need to have the highest amount of individ-
ual action (number of kickings). It is important to note that both Ballester et al. (2006) and our
framework are not seeking the best players in the network. The identied key players and key groups
have the highest contribution to the corresponding aggregate Nash equilibrium. We show that there
is a positive relationship between the average ratings and TICM and ICM in the sample. This
fact reects that soccer players having more interactions with their teammates get more credit in
performance by the experts. More importantly, the market value of the soccer players increase with
both TICM and ICM which is assumed to be reected in their salaries. This eect is homogenous
in the sample, it doesn't depend on the position of the player on the eld.
One interesting extension of the approach in the paper might be considering the eort variable to
be a vector and allowing dierent types of individual actions. This will require that we obtain a new
set of theocratical results. Depending on the availability of data this model then can be empirically
tested. In soccer for instance one could include tackling and dribbling data. Given the relationship
between passing and scoring opportunities, this will not alter our primary results, but will provide
us a more precise way to identify key players and key groups.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.a:
23Proof. Note that equation (9) still holds for this case.  matrix is substituted in equation (10) to
obtain:
(I + U   G)x =  + 
where  is now a n1 column vector and its elements shows the returns to individual actions. Now,
substitute x  1 instead of U  x:
[I   G]x =    x  1 +   ! [I   G]x =    x  1 + 
And pre-multiply both sides by [I   G] 1 matrix to obtain:
x = [I   G] 1( + )   x[I   G] 1  1
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Now, rewrite the payo function by using the above denition such that:
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e ( + x + ) = 0
In the above equation, e  is not zero matrix (since the diagonal elements are not equal to 0), then
the second term must be equal to a zero vector. By using this, if the equation is solved for x, then:
x() =
be (g;e ) + f b(g;)
e  + e ^ b(g;e )
(14)
8 Tables
Table 1: Spain vs Germany Final Game, a=0.125 and d=0.5
Name Position ^ ci ci Name Position ^ ci ci
Xavi M 4.31 3.97 Lahm D 4.38 3.73
Fabregas M 3.97 3.35 Schweinsteiger M 4.31 3.57
Senna M 3.66 3.66 Frings M 4.02 4.02
Ramos D 3.53 3.53 Podolski M 4.01 3.45
Capdevila D 3.49 3.49 Metzelder D 3.88 3.88
Puyol D 3.48 3.48 Mertesacker D 3.77 3.77
Silva M 3.47 3.36 Ballack M 3.71 3.38
Guiza* F 3.46 3.02 Klose F 3.59 3.14
Marchena D 3.46 3.46 Hitzlsperger M 3.58 3.58
Iniesta M 3.45 3.45 Friedrich D 3.47 3.47
Torres F 3.18 2.98 Lehmann G 3.34 3.34
Xabi Alonso* M 3.14 3.14 Jansen* M 3.25 3.25
Cazorla* M 3.11 3.11 Gomez* F 3.12 3.12
Casillas G 3.07 3.07 Kuranyi* F 2.99 2.99
Table 1: In the above Table, the rst 4 columns are for Spain and the remaining ones are for
Germany. ^ ci represents TICM and ci represents ICM. * indicates that player is a substitute.
25Table 2: Spain vs Russia Semi-Final Game, a=0.125 and d=0.5
Name Position ^ ci ci Name Position ^ ci ci
Ramos D 5.37 5.37 Zyryanov M 4.87 4.56
Silva M 5.49 5.35 Semak M 4.37 4.37
Fabregas* M 6.02 5.24 Zhirkov D 4.12 4.12
Xavi M 5.48 5.09 Anyukov D 4.10 4.10
Iniesta D 4.97 4.97 Ignashevich D 3.84 3.84
Senna M 4.82 4.82 Berezutski D 3.83 3.83
Capdevila D 4.23 4.23 Arshavin F 4.06 3.70
Xabi Alonso* M 4.11 4.11 Saenko M 3.63 3.63
Torres F 4.28 4.06 Semshov M 3.57 3.58
Marchena D 4.02 4.02 Sychev* F 3.46 3.46
Puyol D 3.75 3.75 Akinfeev G 3.36 3.36
Casillas G 3.69 3.69 Pavlyuchenko F 3.51 3.30
Villa F 4.07 3.59 Biyaletdinov* M 3.28 3.28
Guiza* F 4.06 3.58
Table 2: In the above Table, the rst 4 columns are for Spain and the remaining ones are for Russia.
^ ci represents TICM and ci represents ICM. * indicates that player is a substitute.
Table 3: Germany vs Turkey Semi-Final Game, a=0.125 and d=0.5
Name Position ^ ci ci Name Position ^ ci ci
Schweinsteiger M 4.96 4.15 Hamit M 4.73 4.73
Mertesacker D 3.84 3.85 Ayhan M 4.65 4.65
Lahm D 4.48 3.82 Sabri D 4.64 4.64
Friedrich D 3.75 3.75 Hakan D 4.32 4.32
Hitzlsperger M 3.75 3.75 Kazim M 4.23 4.23
Frings* M 3.68 3.68 Ugur M 4.92 4.23
Metzelder D 3.67 3.67 Aurelio M 4.15 4.15
Podolski M 4.12 3.55 Gokhan D 4.14 4.14
Ballack M 3.61 3.29 Mehmet M 4.11 4.11
Rolfes M 3.22 3.22 Semih F 4.72 3.85
Klose F 3.51 3.07 Gokdeniz* M 3.45 3.45
Lehmann G 2.98 2.98 Rustu G 3.44 3.44
Jansen* M 2.91 2.91 Tumer* M 3.34 3.34
Mevlut* F 3.43 3.43
Table 3: In the above Table, the rst 4 columns are for Germany and the remaining ones are for
Turkey. ^ ci represents TICM and ci represents ICM. * indicates that player is a substitute.
26Table 4: Netherlands vs Russia Quarter Final Game, a=0.125 and d=0.5
Name Position ^ ci ci Name Position ^ ci ci
Van Bronchorst D 5.32 4.34 Arshavin F 4.98 4.60
Van Der Vaart M 5.08 5.08 Zhirkov D 4.56 4.56
Nistelrooy F 5.05 4.63 Pavlyuchenko F 4.47 4.24
Sneijder M 4.51 4.30 Zyryanov M 4.46 4.16
Van Persie* F 4.50 4.16 Semak M 4.22 4.22
Heitinga* D 4.43 4.43 Torbinski* M 4.17 3.68
Boulahrouz D 4.39 4.39 Anyukov D 4.01 4.01
Oojer D 4.35 4.35 Semshov M 3.91 3.91
De Jong M 4.24 4.24 Saenko M 3.90 3.90
Kuyt M 4.21 3.73 Kolodin D 3.88 3.88
Afellay* M 4.16 4.16 Ignashevich D 3.76 3.76
Van Der Sarr G 4.09 4.09 Bilyaletdinov* M 3.76 3.68
Englaar M 4.03 4.03 Akinfeev G 3.52 3.52
Mathijsen D 4.00 4.00 Sychev* F 3.40 3.40
Table 4: In the above Table, the rst 4 columns are for Netherlands and the remaining ones are for
Russia. ^ ci represents TICM and ci represents ICM. * indicates that player is a substitute.
Table 5: Germany vs Portugal Quarter Final Game, a=0.125 and d=0.5
Name Position ^ ci ci Name Position ^ ci ci
Ballack M 5.10 4.69 Deco M 6.44 5.81
Schweinsteiger M 5.47 4.58 Simao M 5.39 5.39
Podolski M 5.20 4.55 Ronaldo M 5.47 5.31
Rolfes M 4.38 4.38 Bosingwa D 5.18 5.18
Lahm D 4.95 4.25 Ferreira D 4.70 4.70
Hitzlsperger M 4.05 4.05 Pepe D 5.15 4.63
Klose F 5.01 3.96 Petit M 4.51 4.51
Friedrich D 3.87 3.87 Meireles* M 4.91 4.48
Lehmann G 3.60 3.60 Carvalho D 4.40 4.40
Mertesacker D 3.58 3.58 Moutinho M 4.02 4.02
Metzelder D 3.57 3.57 Nani* M 4.02 4.02
Fritz* M 3.39 3.39 Nuno Gomes F 4.39 3.98
Borowski* M 3.32 3.32 Postiga* F 4.26 3.85
Jansen* M 3.31 3.31 Ricardo G 3.81 3.81
Table 5: In the above Table, the rst 4 columns are for Germany and the remaining ones are for
Portugal. ^ ci represents TICM and ci represents ICM. * indicates that player is a substitute.
27Table 6: Spain vs Italy Quarter Final Game, a=0.125 and d=0.5
Name Position ^ ci ci Name Position ^ ci ci
Silva M 8.14 7.97 Grosso D 5.74 5.74
Capdevila D 7.53 7.53 De Rossi M 5.13 5.13
Fabregas* M 8.47 7.49 Ambrossini M 4.93 4.93
Senna M 7.23 7.23 Aquilani M 4.73 4.73
Xavi M 7.61 7.13 Zambrotta D 4.65 4.65
Ramos D 6.52 6.52 Camoranesi* M 4.65 4.65
Marchena D 6.14 6.14 Chiellini D 4.56 4.56
Villa F 6.59 5.99 Toni F 4.38 4.38
Iniesta M 5.67 5.67 Panucci D 4.99 4.29
Puyol D 5.63 5.63 Cassano F 4.28 4.28
Torres F 5.54 5.29 Buon G 4.05 4.05
Cazorla* M 5.18 5.18 Di Natale* F 4.05 4.05
Guiza* F 5.32 4.77 Perrotta M 3.94 3.94
Casillas G 4.72 4.72 Del Piero* F 3.59 3.59
Table 6: In the above Table, the rst 4 columns are for Spain and the remaining ones are for Italy.
^ ci represents TICM and ci represents ICM. * indicates that player is a substitute.
Table 7: Croatia vs Turkey Quarter Final Game, a=0.125 and d=0.5
Name Position ^ ci ci Name Position ^ ci ci
Modric M 5.69 4.58 Arda M 7.67 5.26
Pranjic D 4.47 4.47 Hamit M 5.24 5.24
Rakitic M 4.18 4.18 Tuncay M 5.24 5.24
N. Kovac M 3.97 3.97 Hakan D 5.11 5.11
Simunic D 3.90 3.90 Nihat F 5.03 4.40
Srna M 4.06 3.83 Sabri D 4.24 4.24
Corluka D 3.77 3.77 Gokhan D 4.14 4.14
R. Kovac D 3.77 3.77 Emre D 4.13 4.13
Kranjcar M 3.66 3.66 Mehmet M 4.09 4.09
Olic F 3.64 3.37 Semih* F 4.89 3.99
Petric* F 3.32 3.32 Kazim M 3.91 3.91
Klasnic* F 4.05 3.31 Ugur* M 4.48 3.82
Pletikosa G 3.21 3.21 Rustu G 3.69 3.69
Gokdeniz* M 3.43 3.43
Table 7: In the above Table, the rst 4 columns are for Croatia and the remaining ones are for
Turkey. ^ ci represents TICM and ci represents ICM. * indicates that player is a substitute.
28Table 8: Key Group of Spain in Euro 2008, TICM, a=0.125, d=0.5
Match Group Size Player Position Rank in ^ c Player Names ^ cg
Final 2 M, M 1,2 Xavi, Fabregas 7.78
Final 2 M, F 1,8 Xavi, Guiza 7.36
Final 3 M, M, F 1,2,8 Xavi, Fabregas, Guiza 10.58
Final 3 M, M, M 1,2,3 Xavi, Fabregas, Senna 10.49
Semi-Final 2 M, M 1,3 Fabregas, Xavi 10.48
Semi-Final 2 M, M 1,2 Fabregas, Silva 10.40
Semi-Final 3 M, M, M 1,2,3 Fabregas, Silva, Xavi 14.03
Semi-Final 3 M, M, D 1,2,4 Fabregas, Silva, Ramos 13.76
Quarter Final 2 M, M 1,3 Fabregas, Xavi 14.49
Quarter Final 2 M, M 1,2 Fabregas, Silva 14.15
Quarter Final 3 M, M, M 1,2,3 Fabregas, Silva, Xavi 18.87
Quarter Final 3 M, M, F 1,3,6 Fabregas, Xavi, Vila 18.66
Table 9: Key Group of Germany in Euro 2008, TICM, a=0.125, d=0.5
Match Group Size Player Position Rank in ^ c Player Names ^ cg
Final 2 D, M 1,2 Lahm, Schweinsteiger 8.28
Final 2 M, M 2,4 Schweinsteiger, Podolski 7.97
Final 3 D, M, M 1,2,4 Lahm, Schweinsteiger, Podolski 11.44
Final 3 M, M, M 2,3,4 Schweinsteiger, Frings, Podolski 11.25
Semi-Final 2 M, D 1,2 Schweinsteiger, Lahm 8.92
Semi-Final 2 M, M 1,3 Schweinsteiger, Podolski 8.52
Semi-Final 3 M, D, M 1,2,3 Schweinsteiger, Lahm, Podolski 11.93
Semi-Final 3 M, D, M 1,2,9 Schweinsteiger, Lahm, Ballack 11.69
Quarter Final 2 M, M 1,2 Schweinsteiger, Podolski 9.86
Quarter Final 2 M, F 1,4 Schweinsteiger, Klose 9.85
Quarter Final 3 M, M, F 1,2,4 Schweinsteiger, Podolski, Klose 13.71
Quarter Final 3 M, M, D 1,4,5 Schweinsteiger, Klose, Lahm 13.69
Table 10: Key Group of Russia in Euro 2008 TICM, a=0.125, d=0.5
Match Group Size Player Position Rank in ^ c Player Names ^ cg
Semi-Final 2 M, M 1,2 Zyryanov, Semak 8.36
Semi-Final 2 M, D 1, 4 Zyryanov, Anyukov 8.19
Semi-Final 3 M, M, F 1,2,5 Zyryanov, Semak, Arshavin 11.23
Semi-Final 3 M, D, F 1,4,5 Zyryanov, Anyukov, Arshavin 11.11
Quarter Final 2 F, M 1,4 Arshavin, Zyryanov 8.80
Quarter Final 2 F, F 1,3 Arshavin, Pavlyuchenko 8.79
Quarter Final 3 F, F, M 1,3,6 Arshavin, Pavlyuchenko, Torbinski 12.08
Quarter Final 3 F, D, F 1,2,3 Arshavin, Zhirkov, Pavlyuchenko 11.95
29Table 11: Key Group of Turkey in Euro 2008 TICM, a=0.125, d=0.5
Match Group Size Player Position Rank in ^ c Player Names ^ cg
Semi-Final 2 M, F 1,2 Ugur, Semih 9.18
Semi-Final 2 F, D 2,5 Semih, Sabri 8.96
Semi-Final 3 M, F, D 1,2,5 Ugur, Semih, Sabri 12.60
Semi-Final 3 M, F, M 1,2,3 Ugur, Semih, Hamit 12.54
Quarter Final 2 M, F 1,5 Arda, Nihat 11.89
Quarter Final 2 M, F 1, 6 Arda, Semih 11.85
Quarter Final 3 M, F, F 1,5,6 Arda, Nihat, Semih 12.31
Quarter Final 3 M, M, F 1,2,6 Arda, Hamit, Semih 12.18
Table 12: Key Groups of Other Countries in Euro 2008 TICM, a=0.125, d=0.5
Match Group Size Player Position Rank in ^ c Player Names ^ cg
Netherlands
Quarter Final 2 D, F 1,3 Bronckhorst, Nistelrooy 9.81
Quarter Final 2 D, M 1,2 Bronckhorst, Vaart 9.64
Quarter Final 3 D, M, F 1,2,3 Bronckhorst, Vaart, Nistelrooy 13.27
Quarter Final 3 D, F, F 1,3,5 Bronckhorst, Nistelrooy, Persie 13.15
Portugal
Quarter Final 2 M, D 1,5 Deco, Pepe 10.73
Quarter Final 2 M, M 1,2 Deco, Ronaldo 10.60
Quarter Final 3 M, M, D 1,2,5 Deco, Ronaldo, Pepe 14.35
Quarter Final 3 M, D, M 1,5,6 Deco, Pepe, Meireles 14.15
Italy
Quarter Final 2 D, D 1,3 Grosso, Panucci 9.91
Quarter Final 2 D, M 1,2 Grosso, De Rossi 9.78
Quarter Final 3 D, M, D 1,2,3 Grosso, De Rossi, Panucci 13.47
Quarter Final 3 D, D, D 1,3,7 Grosso, Panucci, Zambrotta 13.25
Croatia
Quarter Final 2 F, M 1,5 Modric, Klasnic 9.21
Quarter Final 2 D, M 1,2 Modric, Pranjic 9.17
Quarter Final 3 D, F, M 1,2,5 Modric, Pranjic, Klasnic 12.31
Quarter Final 3 D, D, M 1,3,5 Modric, Rakitic, Klasnic 12.18
30Table 13: Key Group of Spain in Euro 2008 ICM, a=0.125, d=0.5
Match Group Size Player Position Rank in ^ c Player Names ^ cg
Final 2 M, M 1, 2 Xavi, Senna 7.02
Final 2 M, D 1, 3 Xavi, Ramos 6.97
Final 3 M, D, D 1, 3, 4 Xavi, Ramos, Capdevila 9.61
Final 3 M, D, D 1, 3, 5 Xavi, Ramos, Puyol 9.60
Semi-Final 2 D, M 1,2 Ramos, Silva 9.52
Semi-Final 2 M, M 2,3 Silva, Fabregas 9.45
Semi-Final 3 M, D, M 5,1,3 Iniesta, Ramos, Fabregas 12.82
Semi-Final 3 M, M, M 5,4,8 Iniesta, Xavi, Xabi 12.73
Quarter Final 2 D, M 2,1 Capdevila, Silva 13.51
Quarter Final 2 M, M 4,1 Senna, Silva 13.13
Quarter Final 3 D, M, M 2,4,1 Capdevila, Senna, Silva 17.48
Quarter Final 3 D, M, M 2,4,3 Capdevila, Senna, Fabregas 17.39
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Average Rating 110 6.18 0.86 3.33 8.17
Intercentrality (ICM) 110 4.18 0.60 2.99 5.81
Team Intercentrality (TICM) 110 4.379 0.741 2.986 7.671
Log Market Value 110 2.325 0.775 0.182 4.248
Age 110 27.035 3.741 20 38
Club UEFA Points 104 71.22 29.32 10.53 125.00
Nation UEFA Points 110 44.56 17.12 11.62 75.27
Germany 110 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
Croatia 110 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
Netherlands 110 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Spain 110 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00
Russia 110 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Portugal 110 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
Turkey 110 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Italy 110 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00
Defender 110 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Midelder 110 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Forward 110 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
Table 14: Average ratings for the players are obtained by taking the average of the player ratings
available through Goal.com ESPN Soccer and Skysports. Log of the market value of players are
obtained from transfermarkt.de. Spain, Germany, Russia Turkey, Netherlands, Croatia, Italy and
Portugal are the dummy variables which are equal to 1 if player i is playing for the corresponding
national team and 0 otherwise. D, M and F are dummy variables to indicate the eld position of
the players. They represent Defender, Midelder and Forward respectively. Club and Nation UEFA
points are available from UEFA's website. We use 2008 points, which is earned in 2003-2008 period
by clubs or nations in UEFA tournaments.
31Table 15: Average Ratings and (Team) Intercentrality Measure Pooled OLS Estimation
Variable I II III IV V VI
Intercentrality (ICM) 0.184* 0.158 0.161
(0.102) (0.109) (0.125)
Team Intercentrality (TICM) 0.278*** 0.253** 0.241**
(0.096) (0.100) (0.106)
ET 0.262 0.338 0.339 0.173 0.239 0.237
(0.242) (0.259) (0.263) (0.232) (0.251) (0.256)
Age 0.031 0.158 0.155 0.085 0.198 0.161
(0.272) (0.268) (0.269) (0.248) (0.244) (0.246)
Age squared -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Club UEFA Points 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
Nation UEFA Points 0.009* 0.010* 0.010* 0.009 0.010* 0.010*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Defender -0.359** -0.272 -0.313* -0.036
(0.171) (0.735) (0.166) (0.734)
Forward -0.21 -0.27 -0.208 -0.984









Constant 4.836 3.303 3.317 3.731 2.378 2.934
(3.634) (3.573) (3.605) (3.341) (3.287) (3.321)
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167
Number of Players 110 110 110 110 110 110
R-squared 0.09 0.111 0.112 0.126 0.143 0.148
Wald Chi Sq statistic 4.44 3.54 2.99 7.49 5.70 4.37
Table 15: The dependent variable is average ratings and the pooled OLS coecients are reported in
the above regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate
1, 5 and 10 percent signicance levels respectively. Goalkeepers are excluded from the sample.
DxICM, FxICM, DxTICM and FxTICM are interaction variables obtained by interacting the (team)
intercentrality measure with the position dummy. ET is a dummy variable which takes the value of
1 if the player played more than 90 minutes in any of the matches and 0 otherwise.
32Table 16: Average Ratings and (Team) Intercentrality GLS Estimation
Variable I II III IV V VI
Intercentrality (ICM) 0.299** 0.229** 0.198
(0.120) (0.113) (0.150)
Team Intercentrality (TICM) 0.310*** 0.266*** 0.231*
(0.106) (0.100) (0.134)
Age -0.181 -0.078 -0.089 -0.115 -0.012 -0.033
(0.318) (0.285) (0.313) (0.310) (0.296) (0.308)
Age Squared 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Club UEFA pts -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Nation UEFA pts 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Defender -0.145 -0.702 -0.118 -0.116
(0.213) (1.232) (0.216) (1.076)
Forward -0.471* -0.732 -0.479* -2.067









Constant 7.910* 6.867* 7.163* 6.875 5.745 6.257
(4.396) (3.907) (4.350) (4.285) (4.108) (4.417)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104
R square 0.087 0.118 0.119 0.114 0.147 0.159
R square adj 0.041 0.053 0.035 0.069 0.085 0.079
Wald Chi Sq Statistic 9.46 13.91 12.03 10.87 16.88 18.52
Table 16: The dependent variable is average ratings and the GLS estimation results are reported
in the above regressions. Bootstrapped robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, *
indicate 1, 5 and 10 percent signicance levels respectively. Goalkeepers are excluded from sample.
DxICM, FxICM, DxTICM and FxTICM are interaction variables obtained by interacting the (team)
intercentrality measure with the position dummy.
33Table 17: Market Values and (Team) Intercentrality GLS Estimation
Variable I II III IV V VI
Intercentrality (ICM) 0.129* 0.164** 0.240***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.090)
Team Intercentrality (TICM) 0.132** 0.145*** 0.204***
(0.056) (0.053) (0.061)
Age 0.314 0.301 0.329 0.341 0.33 0.344*
(0.219) (0.198) (0.207) (0.227) (0.213) (0.207)
Age squared -0.008* -0.007** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008** -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Club UEFA pts 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Nation UEFA pts 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Defender -0.163 1.223 -0.153 0.802
(0.134) (0.747) (0.139) (0.715)
Forward 0.184 0.761 0.153 1.296









Constant -2.115 -2.084 -2.82 -2.541 -2.442 -2.994
(2.985) (2.667) (2.790) (3.084) (2.931) (2.843)
Observations 104 104 104 104 104 104
R square 0.483 0.501 0.523 0.489 0.509 0.524
R square adj 0.456 0.470 0.477 0.463 0.473 0.479
Wald Chi Sq Statistic 104.62 133.43 121.25 100.81 126.04 138.07
Table 17: The dependent variable is the log of 2010 market value of the players obtained from
transfermarkt.de in the above regressions. Goalkeepers are excluded from the sample. DxICM,
FxICM, DxTICM and FxTICM are variables obtained by interacting the (team) intercentrality
measures with the position dummy of the player. Bootstrapped robust standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1, 5 and 10 percent signicance levels respectively.
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